

Preparing Field Grade Officers for Joint Staff Assignments

**A Monograph
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Abstract

PREPARING FIELD GRADE OFFICERS FOR JOINT STAFF ASSIGNMENTS by MAJ Peter F. Godfrin Jr., AV, 49 pages.

Publication of *Another Crossroads? Professional Military Education Two Decades After the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel* by the House Armed Service Committee calls into question the ability of our current Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) system to prepare officers to serve in joint duty assignments.

This paper examines the joint education field grade officers receive in preparation for joint duty assignments. In this regard, the main areas for examination include the curriculum and the student and faculty composition at the Army Command and General Staff College's Intermediate Level Education (ILE), the Army's delivery method for JPME Phase I. However, in order to sufficiently understand how ILE fits into the continuum of joint education, it is necessary to examine the timing of ILE in relation to the rest of an officer's joint education. Additionally, it is important to determine how the timing of the education links to the assignment of officers to joint duty assignments.

While the joint education provided to field grade officers is basically sound, there are significant areas for improvement that begin with precommissioning and continue through the intermediate level. First, joint education needs to begin much earlier in an officer's career in order to prepare officers for not only joint duty assignments, but also better prepare them for the rest of their joint education. Additionally, the curriculum at ILE, while ensuring it adapts to the continually changing joint operating environment, must continue to focus on the enduring subject matter necessary to prepare officers for joint duty assignments. Finally, a diverse and quality student body and faculty are crucial to the success of joint education at any level.

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Introduction

If the general staff officer has received a good military education in peacetime, then in wartime he will be useful in all endeavors in less time. But without a good education in peacetime, a general staff officer will never perform anything well in wartime.¹

—Gerhard von Scharnhorst

Professional Military Education (PME) is a fundamental mechanism for cultivating future military effectiveness and developing officers to deal with the rigorous intellectual demands in today's complex, uncertain, and ambiguous security environment. The United States Army, and the Department of Defense (DoD) as a whole, must continue to adapt to this environment, constantly reexamining the PME structure to develop an educated, adaptable officer corps capable of fighting and winning the nation's wars.

For Army officers, Intermediate Level Education (ILE) at the Army's Command and General Staff College (CGSC) is the first time students receive a thorough joint education. This is accomplished through the Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) program, which stems from the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the subsequent congressional hearings on joint education by the House Armed Services Committee led by Representative Isaac "Ike" Newton Skelton better known as the Skelton Panel. JPME is conducted in three phases. Phase I (JPME I) is integrated into the existing curriculum at the service's Intermediate-Level Education (ILE) resident and non-resident programs. Phase II (JPME II) is conducted at the Service Senior-Level Colleges (SLCs) as well as the schools under the National Defense University. The final phase of JPME is the Capstone course conducted at

¹ Charles Edward White, *The Enlightened Soldier: Scharnhorst and the Militarische Gesellschaft in Berlin, 1801-1805* (Ann Arbor: UMI, 1987), 137. Quote was translated from Scharnhorst's manuscript *Bruchstück über Erfahrung und Theorie*, Nr. 149, Sheet 48.

the NDU schools. It helps prepare newly-selected General Officers for high-level joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational responsibilities.²

Although a great deal of emphasis has been placed on the joint education of officers, a number of recent studies conclude that staff officers report to commands lacking the knowledge, skills, and critical abilities needed to perform their jobs.³ Additionally, these reports suggest that many officers serve in positions prior to completing the appropriate levels of PME, and those that have attended joint schools consider the education to be inadequate.⁴ This paper will attempt to address these issues by arguing that JPME I at the Army's CGSC is insufficient preparation for field grade officers to serve as staff officers in joint commands. It will examine and evaluate the timing, curriculum, and student and faculty composition of ILE to determine why field grade officers in joint duty assignments are ill prepared to serve as a staff officer. Consideration of these points may reveal changes, modifications, or restructuring to the current JPME structure to ensure the Army continues to adapt in today's Joint Operating Environment (JOE) in order to prepare officers for future joint duty staff assignments.

² US Army Command and General Staff College, *CGSC Circular 350-3* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Combined Arms Center, 1 Dec 2005), 2-1 and 2-2, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP)*, Washington, D.C.: JCS, 2009, OPMEP 1800d, A-B-1 and E-K-1. The schools under the National Defense University that award joint credit are the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, the National War College, and Joint Advanced Warfighting School.

³ Linda Fenty, *The Joint Staff Officer Project: Phases I and II Final Report*, April 2008, 14. In March 2006, the Joint Staff J-7 Joint Exercise and Training Division (JETD) initiated a three-phased project to determine the competencies joint staff officers need for successful job performance. The report was completed by Dr. Linda Fenty, an expert in strategic planning, organizational development, adult learning and assessments with significant experience in training, education, and training technologies in commercial and government industries.

⁴ House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, *Another Crossroads? Professional Military Education Two Decades After the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel*, April 2010, 111th Congress, 2nd Session, H. Committee Print 111-4, xiv.

Background of the Joint Professional Military Education System

The United States' PME system began with the establishment of precommissioning schools, the U.S. Military Academy in 1802 and the U.S. Naval Academy in 1845, following the European realization that nations needed better educated militaries for large-scale, ideologically motivated, industrial wars.⁵ By 1881, the Army created the School of Application for Infantry and Cavalry, in large part because of the poor state of professional training of the officer corps, to prepare Army officers for future wars. Initially, the school focused its studies on the tactical level of war and remedial instruction of general academic subjects.⁶ Not until 1886 did the school abolish its curriculum of remedial and tactical studies and begin to focus on a more practical study of general problem solving. While the school became a significant factor in the development of theory and practice within the U.S. Army, the limited number of graduates were too junior to have widespread influence on the Army.

In 1898, the American participation in the Spanish American War and the follow-on involvement in the Philippine Insurrection interrupted instruction at the School of Application for four years. The wars also demonstrated that the United States not only needed to train the hundreds of new lieutenants entering the Army but also “needed general staff officers, experts who could plan a national mobilization and organize and administer the large units that such a mobilization would require.”⁷

⁵ William E. Simons, ed., *PME* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000), 1.

⁶ Jonathan M. House, “The Fort and the New School, 1881-1916” in *A Brief History of Fort Leavenworth, 1827-1983*, John W. Partin, ed., (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1983), 44. House states, “The first year of each two-year course was taken up with the study of geometry, grammar, penmanship, and general history. The remaining year focused upon the rudiments of tactics, communications, field fortifications, and military law.” See also Timothy K. Nenninger, *The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), Chapters 1 and 2.

⁷ Ibid., 46.

By 1901, Elihu Root, the Secretary of War, realizing the need for an education system capable of developing general staff officers, established a basic PME framework, which included a hierarchy of both Army and Navy service schools at both the intermediate and senior level. The School of Application was re-established as a one-year course and renamed the School of the Line while the best students were selected to study for a second year at the Army Staff College. In 1916, the Army PME system was put on hold again when the Regular Army mobilized due to problems on the border with Mexico and then again a year later when the U.S. entered World War I.⁸

Following World War I, War Department Order 112 officially reopened the Army's professional education schools, and the National Defense Act of 1920 formally established a progressive Army educational system.⁹ Beginning in 1928, the Command and General Staff School, as it was now called, returned to a two-year course focused mostly on tactical exercises and map problems. By 1938, with World War II looming, the school reverted to a one-year course and shifted its focus from tactical exercises toward preparing officers for general staff duties.¹⁰

As early as World War I, the War Department recognized the need for joint education at the intermediate level and set forth to modify comprehensively the U.S. officer education system to focus more on joint education for officers and synchronize this education with the services' schools. In 1944, the Joint Chiefs formed the Special Committee for Reorganization of the

⁸ Charles E. Heller, "World War I and the Interwar Years, 1916-1939" in *A Brief History of Fort Leavenworth, 1827-1983*, John W. Partin, ed., (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1983), 49. See also Nenninger, Chapter 4 - 8.

⁹ Peter J. Schifferle, *America's School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II (Modern War Studies)* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2010), 32-35. Dr. Schifferle goes into detail regarding the "comprehensive system of officer and soldier education, from precommissioning through colonel-level instruction" in the interwar period.

¹⁰ Heller, 53-54.

National Defense, known as the Richardson Committee, to determine how joint the postwar military should be. The committee stated:

There are three basic requirements of the Armed Forces for the program of joint education and training. First, there must be an exchange of duties and joint training on appropriate levels particularly designed to enable juniors to work together in the execution of joint plans drawn by their seniors. Second, joint education must be provided at intermediate levels to develop officers capable of planning and participating in joint operations. Third, joint education must be provided at high levels to develop officers capable of formulating strategic concepts and conducting, in command positions, large-scale operations employing all components.¹¹

The committee had a major impact on the future of officer education in the United States. Based on the findings of the Richardson Committee, by 1946 the War Department had modified, reopened, or established the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF), the National War College (NWC) and other senior level service and joint schools. More importantly, it transformed the Army-Navy Staff College (ANSCOL) into the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC), the first military school to provide joint operational instruction to mid-grade officers.¹² In 1950, the Army War College, which closed its doors in the 1940s as trained and experienced officers were needed during World War II, reopened to address the growing Army's needs for more officers with an advanced education.¹³ In 1976, the National Defense University was established following the Vietnam War to consolidate the management of the ICAF, the NWC, and the AFSC, which later became the Joint Forces Staff College.¹⁴

¹¹ John W. Yeager, "The Origins of Joint Military Professional Education," *Joint Force Quarterly* no. 37 (April 2005), 78. Quoted from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS 962/2: Joint Chiefs of Staff General Plan for Postwar Joint Education of the Armed Forces (June 22, 1945). Special Collections, National Defense University Library, Washington, D.C.

¹² Ibid., 78-79.

¹³ US Army War College, "The United States Army War College History," US Army War College, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/about/Historic.cfm> (accessed March 29, 2011).

¹⁴ National Defense University, "The History of the National Defense University," National Defense University, <http://www.ndu.edu/info/history.cfm> (accessed March 29, 2011) and Joint Forces Staff College, "History of the Joint Forces Staff College," Joint Forces Staff College, <http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/about/history.asp> (accessed March 29, 2011).

In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Act was enacted to fix the command structure of the U.S. military, which had experienced significant inter-service rivalry problems that had become apparent during the Vietnam War, Operation EAGLE CLAW, and Operation URGENT FURY.¹⁵ Inherent in this legislation was the need for comprehensive modifications and upgrades to the JPME system. The law required the DoD to “review and revise its curriculum for senior and intermediate grade officers in order to strengthen the focus on - (1) joint matters; and (2) preparing officers for joint duty assignments.”¹⁶ Following the passing of this landmark legislation, the U.S. House of Representatives established a panel on Joint Professional Military Education, named the Skelton Panel after its chairman, Congressman Ike Skelton.

In 1988, Chairman Skelton issued a “Report of the Panel on Military Education” that painted a bleak picture of the intellectual rigor and quality at PME institutions. The report made specific recommendations on how to implement the joint reforms laid out in the Goldwater-Nichols Act. It also identified the need for a multi-phased joint education process that included a Joint Professional Military Education - Phase One (JPME I) that would be institutionalized through officer in-residence education systems and taught to all officers.¹⁷

In the two decades since the Skelton Report was released, the Department of Defense implemented a five-phase JPME system that consists of five levels: Precommissioning, Primary, Intermediate (JPME I), Senior (JPME II), and General/Flag Officer or Capstone (JPME III).¹⁸ In Academic Year 1989-90, the Army’s CGSC began conducting JPME I as part of its in-residence

¹⁵ Ronald H. Cole, “Grenada, Panama, and Haiti: Joint Operational Reform,” *Joint Force Quarterly* no. 20 (Autumn/Winter 1988/1989), 57.

¹⁶ *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, HR 3622, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., Congressional Record 131, (October 1, 1986): 10 USC 663.

¹⁷ House Committee on Armed Services, *Report of the Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress of the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives*, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 1989. Committee Print No. 4, 3.

¹⁸ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP)*, Washington, D.C.: JCS, 2009, OPMEP 1800d, A-A-2.

program. In 1991, the College expanded JPME I to include the non-resident Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC).¹⁹ In 2004, the Intermediate Level Education (ILE) program was implemented to replace the traditional CGSC, providing mid-career officers the opportunity to attend resident intermediate level schooling.²⁰ In January 2009, the CGSC established a new Blended Learning Course because of expanding resident enrollments and a corresponding reduction in available space in order to provide the intermediate level education through a combination of in-residence and distance learning programs.²¹

In 2009, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) reviewed the state of the officer in-residence professional military education system to determine what should be done to improve PME. In 2010, the committee released its final report, *Another Crossroads? Professional Military Education Two Decades After the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel*, and found that Intermediate Level Education and JPME I were insufficient preparation for joint duty assignments and that JPME may require more emphasis on competencies needed by staff officers if they are to contribute to effective staff performance in joint assignments.²²

From the founding of the U.S. Military Academy to the establishment of the schools of the National Defense University, officer education has been the bedrock for preparing for future wars. While the schools continually adapted depending on the contemporary operating environment, they have maintained a focus on developing general staff officers over the last hundred years. Following World War I, the War Department set the stage for early joint military education, but it was not until the Richardson Committee prescribed the “three basic requirements of the Armed Forces for the program of joint education” that the multi-phased approach to joint

¹⁹ CGSC Cir 350-3, 2-2.

²⁰ Norm Hilton, *ILE Information Paper*, SFAE-CM, May 19, 2008.

²¹ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Process For Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE), Report of Accreditation of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Blended Learning Course Location (30 March 2009), 2-3.

²² *Another Crossroads*, 37-38.

education was first introduced. However, the current joint education system's roots began with the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the subsequent congressional hearings held by Representative Skelton. The Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Skelton Report provide the foundation for any analysis of the JPME system. In 2009, the House Armed Services Committee held a second set of hearings to review that state of the JPME system and, based on their findings, made several recommendations in their final report titled *Another Crossroads?*

Goldwater-Nichols Act

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, sponsored by Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Arizona) and Representative William Nichols (D-Alabama), was enacted, in part, to ensure that the DoD was better prepared to plan, support, and execute joint operations. In addition to restructuring the military chain of command and increasing the powers of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the Goldwater-Nichols Act directed significant changes to improve both joint education and the selection and management of officers in joint duty assignments.

In order to meet the primary purpose of the legislation, which was to "strengthen the joint elements of the military," the Goldwater-Nichols Act stipulated three major changes to joint education and joint officer assignments.²³ First, it placed the responsibility for "formulating policies for the joint training...[and] for coordinating the military education and training of members of the armed forces" on the CJCS.²⁴ It also required the CJCS to periodically review and revise the curriculum for joint professional military education schools to enhance the education and training of officers in joint matters by ensuring the schools maintained rigorous standards for the military education of officers with the joint specialty. Additionally, it required

²³ *Report of the Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress*, 11.

²⁴ *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, 18.

the DoD to review and revise the curriculum for intermediate level education in order to strengthen the focus on joint matters and prepare officers for joint duty assignments.²⁵

The Goldwater-Nichols Act also created a new category of officers termed Joint Specialty Officers (JSOs). JSOs were to be “particularly trained in, and oriented towards, joint matters.”²⁶ In order to attain the joint specialty, officers (senior captain or equivalent) must have been selected by the Secretary of Defense, must have completed an appropriate program at a JPME school, and must have completed a full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment. In order to ensure that the services selected high caliber officers for the joint staff, protect officers from the established service cultures, and provide an incentive for officers to compete for joint duty assignments the Goldwater-Nichols Act established a quota to ensure that officers who have the joint specialty or have served in a joint duty assignment would be promoted at a rate not less than the rate of other officers.²⁷

Finally, the Goldwater-Nichols Act established requirements for the assignment of not only JSOs but also other officers who graduate “from a joint professional military education school,” ensuring that qualified officers filled a majority of the joint duty assignments. Specifically, the law stipulated that JSOs (or JSO nominees) must fill approximately half of all joint duty assignments above the rank of captain. Furthermore, the Goldwater-Nichols Act required the Secretary of Defense to designate not fewer than 1,000 joint duty positions as critical, and JSOs should fill all of these positions. The Goldwater-Nichols Act also required that

²⁵ Ibid., 39-40. The Goldwater-Nichols Act defined Joint Duty Assignments as “assignments in which the officer gains significant experience in joint matters and shall exclude-(A) assignments for joint training or joint education; and (B) assignments within an officer’s own military department.”

²⁶ Ibid., 35. See also 10 U.S.C. §661, and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Conference Report 109-702, 107-111 and 711-712. The NDAA of 2007 replaced the old Joint Specialty Officer with the Joint Qualified Officer. For the purposes of this paper, the terms JSO and JQO are used synonymously.

²⁷ Ibid., 35-36. The Goldwater-Nichols Act defined Joint Matters as “matters relating to the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces, including matters relating to (1) national military strategy; (2) strategic planning and contingency planning; and (3) command and control of combat operations under unified command.”

all JSOs should be assigned to a joint duty position as their first assignment following graduation from a joint professional military school and that at least half of all other non-JSO graduates be assigned to a joint duty assignment.²⁸

Skelton Report

One year after the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the HASC established a panel, led by Representative Ike Skelton, to conduct a comprehensive review of “Department of Defense plans for implementing the joint professional military education requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.”²⁹ The Skelton Panel also assessed the ability of the DoD’s PME system to develop officers competent in strategy, joint matters, and tactics. On April 21, 1989, the Skelton Panel published its findings and recommendations in the Report of the Panel on Military Education, also known as the Skelton Report.

In the report, the panel found that the DoD PME system was basically sound but recommended several areas for improvement, including specific recommendations on how the Goldwater-Nichols Act joint reforms should be institutionalized through officer in-residence education. Overall, the panel made recommendations for the improvement of DoD PME which included the establishment of a PME framework that specifies and relates primary education objectives at each PME level; the establishment of a two-phased JSO education process with JPME I taught in service colleges and JPME II taught at the Armed Forces Staff College; and an

²⁸ Ibid., 36-38. The original wording in Section 663 of the Goldwater-Nichols Act specifically stated that “a high proportion (which shall be greater than 50 percent) of other officers graduating from a joint professional military education school also receive assignments to a joint duty assignment.” In that context, the Act referred to “each school of the National Defense University (and of any other joint professional military education school)” which did not exclude graduates of JPME I schools from the assignment requirements. A 2006 amendment to the Goldwater-Nichols Act substituted “a school within the National Defense University,” specified as the national War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and the Joint Forces Staff College, for “a joint professional military education school” thereby eliminating any assignment requirement for graduates of JPME I schools.

²⁹ *Report of the Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress*, v.

improvement in the quality and diversity of civilian and military faculty.³⁰ Regarding the education of non-JSOs at service intermediate schools, the panel found that the schools needed to be better equipped “to teach students about their own service, other services, and joint matters.”³¹ Specifically, the panel addressed three areas to remedy these shortfalls: a joint education for all officers at the intermediate level, a joint curriculum that focuses on joint matters, and a quality, cross-service faculty and student body mix.

First, the Skelton Panel recommended that a PME framework be established that specified and related primary education objectives at each of the PME levels. Specifically, the panel identified that the Intermediate Level should focus on combined arms operations and joint operational art with an introduction to military strategy. In addition to providing a focus for the conduct of education at the intermediate level, the panel identified specific curriculum requirements that needed to be covered, including “capabilities and limitations, doctrine, organizational concepts, and command and control of forces of all services; joint planning processes and systems; and the role of service commands as part of a unified command.”³²

The second key recommendation was the establishment of a two-phase Joint Specialty Officer education process that required JPME I to be taught at the service colleges as a subset of the existing service PME.³³ While the panel focused its recommendations on the training and education of the Joint Specialty Officer, it recognized the fact that “even with the emergence of the joint specialist, joint staffs will continue to be manned primarily by non-joint specialists” and therefore there was a need to “strengthen joint education for all officers.” In this regard, the

³⁰ Ibid., 2-7. The Skelton Panel made nine specific recommendations in their report. Only the key recommendations that apply to JPME I are included in this study.

³¹ Ibid., 87.

³² Ibid., 2-4, 34, and 102.

³³ Ibid., 102.

Skelton report specified that non-JSOs needed training in relevant joint staff procedures and processes and other services' capabilities, limitations and doctrines.³⁴

Additionally, the panel identified that "beyond curriculum, a mixed student body and faculty...are important elements of joint education."³⁵ The panel recognized that a key factor in joint education is the composition of the student body. It identified that joint education is based upon "the mutual understanding and rapport that develops when students from all services study in mixed seminars and share the ideas, values, and traditions of their services, when they solve joint military problems together, and when preconceived notions about the nature of and solution to problems of warfare, learned during service training and education, are challenged daily."³⁶ Therefore, the panel recommended that the representation from each department needed to be substantially higher and that the student body mix should consist of equally high caliber students from each service. Specifically, the panel recommended that each seminar at the intermediate service schools should have "a minimum of two students from each non-host military department" and the goal should be three per seminar.³⁷

Finally, the panel recommended that the military should improve the quality of the faculty by ensuring that "only high-quality military officers" serve on the faculty. In this regard, the panel recognized the difficulties associated with attracting quality military faculty for joint schools who had a clear potential for promotion, proven records of excellence, possessed

³⁴ Ibid., 4, 51, and 57-58. The panel also noted specifically "that one objective of title IV is to increase the appreciation by *all officers* of the importance of joint approaches" and "that *Phase I* be provided not only to potential JSOs but to *all students* attending a service intermediate college."

³⁵ Ibid., 64.

³⁶ Ibid., 64. The Armed Forces Staff College calls this concept "affected learning."

³⁷ Ibid., 107. The panel identified the difficulties with reaching these goals and proposed a phased timeline which required "the *intermediate* service schools obtain military faculty mixes approximating 10 percent from each other military department by academic year 1990-91 and 15 percent by academic year 1995-96; and student body mixes of one officer from each other military department per student seminar by academic year 1990-91 and two officers per seminar by academic year 1995-96. Eventually, each military department should be represented by at least three students in each intermediate school seminar."

advanced degrees, and were graduates of the appropriate level of resident PME.³⁸ In addition to identifying the necessary characteristics of a quality military faculty, the panel identified the need for “a military faculty that is representative of each of the services.” The panel recommended that the faculty mix at the “intermediate service schools should have at least 15 percent from each non-host military department” and, because the PME schools emphasize “that the joint material is inextricably interwoven into the curricula,” these standards should apply to the entire active duty military faculty and not just a “joint education” department.³⁹

Another Crossroads?

Twenty years after the Skelton Panel released its findings, the House Armed Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, reviewed the state of the officer PME system to determine what improvements could be made to PME amid the complex and evolving security challenges of the 21st Century. The Subcommittee evaluated the effectiveness of PME relative to its purpose, assessed if it was responsive to the needs of the military, and appraised the resourcing and rigor of its component schools, including the Army’s Command and General Staff College, in its final report *Another Crossroads? Professional Military Education Two Decades After the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel.*⁴⁰

The Subcommittee found, like the Skelton panel, that the PME system was still basically sound. However, the Subcommittee offered several findings and recommendations that included both systemic and institutional issues that raised concerns with the timing, purpose, and effectiveness of PME. Additionally, the Subcommittee investigated the content and delivery of the PME curricula to ensure it was responsive to changing demands. Finally, it found that a

³⁸ Ibid., 3.

³⁹ Ibid., 66-67.

⁴⁰ *Another Crossroads*, 13.

number of human resource issues required attention, including faculty and student selection and the choosing of appropriate follow-on assignments for graduates.

In its report, the Subcommittee noted that the express purpose of intermediate PME is to prepare officers for joint duty assignments. However, because the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) removed the requirement for officers to complete JPME I prior to serving in joint duty assignments, other than the limited number required to fill critical JDAL billets with Joint Qualified Officers (JQOs), the “former connections supporting JPME I and II as preparation for joint duty assignments have been substantially weakened.”⁴¹ The report also pointed out that a significant number of officers serving in JDAL billets had not yet attended ILE. To remedy this problem, the Subcommittee recommended that “additional joint subject matter (should) be taught at the primary level, especially joint planning and execution processes.”⁴² Based on a study conducted by Dr. Linda Fenty, the Subcommittee noted that while senior leaders respect the commitment and energy of their staff officers, the senior leaders were concerned that current “O-4s and O-5s appear to not understand the basics/fundamentals of staff work.”⁴³ Pointing out that “ILE and JPME I are insufficient preparation for joint duty assignments,” the Subcommittee recommended that the PME curricula required “more emphasis on competencies needed by staff officers if they are to contribute to effective staff officer performance in service-specific and joint staff assignments.”⁴⁴

In addition to recognizing the need for a curriculum focused on preparing officers for joint duty assignments, the Subcommittee evaluated the teaching methods of PME courses.

⁴¹ Ibid., 33. the report points out that Congress removed the requirements for officers to complete JPME I prior to serving in joint duty assignments See 10 U.S.C. §661-668, and *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Conference Report 109-702*, 107-111 and 711-712.

⁴² Ibid., 64.

⁴³ Fenty, 76-77. The Fenty Study’s survey included 137 senior leaders comprised of fifty Division Chiefs of Staff, SES (Senior Executive Service) leaders, and General/Flag officers from all Services and from the active and reserve components (see Figure 29).

⁴⁴ *Another Crossroads*, 58.

Although it clearly preferred an active, rather than passive, learning environment, the Subcommittee made several observations regarding the quality and composition of both faculty and student populations at PME service schools. Concerning student population, the report pointed out that while all schools had met the minimum requirements for non-host service representation, there was no requirement or evaluation method to measure the qualitative impact that students and their career specialties had on seminar dynamics. Additionally, the Subcommittee noted that while an increasing number of interagency students were attending the service schools, many of these students had a background that did not allow them to benefit the seminar's learning environment.⁴⁵

The Subcommittee also recognized that the Army was the only branch that was committed to a universal intermediate level education. The Subcommittee claims that this policy "has had the unintended consequence of excluding many highly-competitive combat arms officers...from attending because of limited windows to attend and because the Army has to push larger numbers of officer through the school without a large increase in infrastructure and resources."⁴⁶ What the report failed to recognize was the other services' ability to provide the minimum number of quality, non-host service students and faculty as required by law and policy. Finally, the faculty portion of the report contained a significant finding that "PME faculties could be better supported in a number of ways."⁴⁷ Specifically, the report made recommendation in the areas of recruiting, tour lengths, and qualifications. Of significant note, the report pointed out that the 2007 NDAA precluded non-host service faculty at JPME I service schools from receiving joint credit.⁴⁸ As a result, this legislation has made it difficult to recruit high quality military

⁴⁵ Ibid., 87.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 159.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 17.

⁴⁸ *John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007*, HR 5122. 109th Cong., 2nd Sess., Congressional Record 109, (May 5, 2006): H 8061-8540.

faculty from across the services and placed the intermediate schools, CGSC in particular, at risk of losing JPME accreditation for not being in compliance with the standards prescribed in the CJCS' Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP).⁴⁹

Throughout its history, the U.S. military continually adapted its professional military education to meet the needs of its contemporary operating environment. Following the United States' experience in Vietnam and other low intensity conflicts in the late twentieth century, a greater emphasis was placed on joint operations, and in particular joint education, with the passing of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. In the year following, the House Armed Services Committee established the Skelton Panel to assess the joint education system's ability to develop officers in joint matters and prepare them for joint duty assignments. Almost two decades, had passed before Congress comprehensively studied the accumulated effects legislative and policy changes have had on PME since the publishing of the Skelton Report. The publication of *Another Crossroads?* represented the latest congressional review on the effectiveness of the PME system. Its findings suggest that the current PME system, while still basically sound, needs improvement in several areas. The significant findings included the increasing need for additional joint subject matter to be taught earlier in officers' careers and that officers are being assigned to joint assignments without having completed appropriate joint education. Additionally, the report found that many officers consider the PME they do receive to be inadequate preparation for joint duty assignments and that the composition of students and faculty should be constantly reviewed to ensure that their characteristics support the schools' educational missions.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ *Another Crossroads*, 136.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, xi-xv.

Analysis of Joint Education for Field Grade Officers

Methodology

In order to focus the analysis, the joint education an officer receives during JPME I is the primary subject for this monograph. In this regard, the main areas for examination include the curriculum and the student and faculty composition at the Army Command and General Staff College's Intermediate Level Education (ILE). However, in order to sufficiently understand how JPME I fits into the continuum of joint education, it is necessary to examine the timing of JPME I in relation to the rest of an officer's joint education. Additionally, it is important to determine how the timing of the education links to the assignment of officers to joint duty assignments.

Officers typically attend JPME I within the first few years of being promoted to major. However, not all officers serving in joint duty assignments are JPME I graduates. Additionally, JPME I is not the first step in the continuum of joint education; there is a preparatory phase of joint education that begins during precommissioning and continues through the primary level of education. Therefore, it is necessary not only to examine when an officers receives joint education but also to determine how the timing of the education relates to the assignment of officers to joint duty assignments. This will be accomplished by examining the legislative and policy requirements concerning "preparatory JPME" and comparing them to the precommissioning and primary military education schools to determine the extent an officer receives a joint education before attending ILE. Additionally, the appropriate legislative guidance and requirements for the assignment of joint education graduates will be analyzed and compared to the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) and other reports in order to determine if the appropriate education is being provided to officers at the right time in their career progression.

In order to determine the effectiveness of the joint curriculum at ILE, it is first necessary to examine the legislative, policy, and other documents that constrain the curriculum of JPME I. This includes, but is not limited to Title 10 legislative requirements as well as guidance from the

Skelton Report and the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP). It also includes other requirements that have been developed through recurring reviews such as Special Areas of Emphasis that are developed by the Military Education Coordination Council. Next, it will be determined whether the current curriculum meets the requirements described in these documents. The Process of Accreditation for Joint Education (PAJE) reports from the last several accreditation cycles as well as archived crosswalks of the joint learning areas and objectives within the ILE curriculum to assist with this determination. Additionally, surveys of recent ILE graduates and joint staff officers conducted by Dr. Linda Fenty and the Quality Assurance Office at CGSC are examined to assist in determining if the current curriculum sufficiently prepares officers for joint staff assignments.

The student and faculty composition are closely linked and both extremely important to the educational experience of those attending JPME I at ILE. The Goldwater-Nichols Act, as well as other legislative and policy documents, describe the regulatory requirements with regard to the composition of both the student body and the faculty. An analysis of these documents, compared with the composition of the ILE student body and faculty for Academic Year 2010-2011, provides a clear understanding to what extent these requirements are being met.

Timing

Any analysis of the professional military education of officers must be conducted within the context of the timing of that education within an officer's career. Legislative and policy documents guide the Army's approach to when and how much joint education an officer receives prior to a joint duty assignment. Current manning priorities show that many officers are being assigned to joint assignments without completing JPME I. To compound this problem, the joint education an officer does receive before attending ILE is not sufficiently focused on joint subjects and does not have any joint oversight or accreditation procedures. These facts all point to the conclusion that many officers are receiving JPME I education too late in their career to prepare

for them for joint duty assignments. Furthermore, a lack of substantial joint education prior to intermediate education and the number of non-JLE graduates serving in joint duty assignments results in officers being assigned to joint staff positions for which they are ill prepared.

The Officer PME Continuum is organized into five military education levels: precommissioning, primary, intermediate, senior, and General/Flag Officer. While the OPMEP prescribes, in general terms, the grades associated with each level and provides an educational focus for each level, it leaves to the Goldwater-Nichols Act and follow-on legislation the policies regarding assignments.⁵¹ The Goldwater-Nichols Act provided significant guidance for the assignment of JSOs. Specifically, it requires that approximately half of all joint duty assignments above the rank of captain and that all of the “critical” joint duty positions be filled by JSOs. More importantly, it stipulated that at least half of all other non-JSO graduates of a joint school be assigned to a joint duty assignment.⁵² However, the 2007 NDAA eased this restriction and currently requires approximately half of all joint duty assignments above the rank of major and all of the “critical” joint duty positions be filled by JQOs. It also specifies that non-JQO graduates of only the National War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and the Joint Forces Staff College be required to send a high proportion to joint duty assignments.⁵³

According to the 2010 JDAL, more than thirty-seven percent of all JDAL billets are designated for Army officers. Of these billets, over eighty percent are designated for officers in

⁵¹ OPMEP 1800d, Annex A to Appendix A.

⁵² *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, 36-38. The original legislation did not exclude JPME I graduates in the definition of “all other non-JSO graduates of a joint school.”

⁵³ *John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007*. Amendments made changes to *Armed Forces, US Code, Title 10*, Chapter 38, sec. 668 (2010) - Subsecs. (a), (b)(1). Pub. L. 109-364, Sec. 518(a)(1),(2)(A), substituted “a school within the National Defense University specified in subsection (c)” for “a joint professional military education school”. Subsec. (b)(2). Pub. L. 109-364, Sec. 518(a)(2)(B), substituted “a school referred to in paragraph (1)” for “a joint professional military education school.”

the grade of O-5 and below with four percent of these listed as critical-JDAL billets.⁵⁴ Army and joint policies allow billets to be filled by officers who are one pay grade below the authorized grade.⁵⁵ This allows for the possibility that O-4s who have not completed JPME I may fill up to 2,664 (about sixty percent) of the 4,475 current Army JDAL positions.⁵⁶ To further exacerbate this problem, the Department of Defense is in the process of incorporating different joint qualification levels for JDAL positions. The “preliminary assessment” made by the DoD to the House Armed Services Committee was that a “majority of JDAL billets will be filled by officers” who have only completed JPME I and some will not be required to complete any JPME at all.⁵⁷

Dr. Linda Fenty, in her Joint Staff Officer Study, analyzed the staff officer billets at each of the Combatant Commands to identify the experiential background of the headquarters’ staffs. As of March 2008, the Combatant Commands were authorized a total of 3,896 staff officers with 86.1 percent in the rank of lieutenant colonel and below and 49.3 percent in the rank of major and below. Additionally, although there were less than 300 officers (or 7.5 percent) in the grade of O-3 and below authorized, more than thirteen percent of the respondents to her survey represented these grades, including sixteen officers below the rank of captain.⁵⁸

The Fenty Study inferred that it is “the exception instead of the rule that a staff officer gets to attend JPME prior to a Combatant Command assignment.” The study also points out that “senior leaders collectively agreed that no one should be serving at a Combatant Command who had not had, at a minimum, ILE” because “without the ILE program experience a staff officer

⁵⁴ 2010 JDAL.

⁵⁵ U.S. Army, *AR 614-185: Requisition and Assignment Instructions For Officers* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1983), 3.

⁵⁶ 2010 JDAL. There are 11963 JDAL positions of which 4475 are slated to be filled by the Army. According to the 2009 JDAL, there were a total of 11678 JDAL positions, of which 4219 were slated to be filled by the Army. While the Army’s JDAL positions have risen from 4219 to 4475, the critical JDAL positions have decreased from 163 to 145.

⁵⁷ *Another Crossroads*, 23.

⁵⁸ Fenty, 22-24.

lacks some of the deeper understanding of the capabilities, tools, processes, and culture of his or her respective Service.” Additionally, according to the study, most of the staff officers surveyed “had very little relevant joint training, PME (Professional Military Education), or joint experience” and “recommended increased efforts on getting more junior officers to JPME I.”⁵⁹

The Goldwater-Nichols Act provided guidance for the education, assignment, and promotion for, not only JQOs, but also all officers who are serving in, or have served in, a joint duty assignment.⁶⁰ As such, while it requires Department of Defense oversight for senior and intermediate grade PME institutions, it does not require any oversight for the precommissioning or primary education schools. These “preparatory JPME” courses are not only supposed to fulfill the service education requirements, but are also “designed to develop progressively the knowledge, analytical skills, perspectives, and values essential for U.S. officers to function effectively in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations.”⁶¹

“Preparatory JPME” schools traditionally include the U.S. Military Academy, Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), Officer Candidate School, Officer Basic Courses, and the Captains’ Career Courses (CCC). The OPMEP provides guidance for the focus of these schools through the identification of joint learning objectives for each level. However, without any type of accreditation or review by the Joint Staff, such as the Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) for JPME I and II courses, there is no mechanism that ensures these school’s programs are meeting the needs of the JPME continuum. In fact, the self-assessment process for Precommissioning and Primary JPME, the Triennial Report, was discontinued in the latest OPMEP.⁶² The Triennial Report required the precommissioning and primary schools to provide

⁵⁹ Ibid.. 9, 58, and 71.

⁶⁰ USC, *Title 10, Armed Forces*, Chapter 38, §622.

⁶¹ OPMEP 1800d, A-A-6.

⁶² Ibid., 4.

an overall assessment of how well the joint learning objectives (JLO) were being addressed, explain the education methodology used in teaching the JLOs, explain internal and external validation/feedback mechanisms, and identify areas for improvement in the joint curriculum and JPME policy and procedures.⁶³

In 2010, the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) initiative replaced the precommissioning to Officer Basic Course structure. BOLC-A, the precommissioning phase, “provides exposure to leadership, imparts enduring values and attributes, and provides skills to prepare officers for follow-on training in selected branch or technical schools.” BOLC-B, the branch phase, “develops competent, confident, adaptable officers grounded in warrior tasks and branch technical and tactical training who are fully prepared to lead Soldiers in full spectrum operations.”⁶⁴ BOLC-A, as well as the commissioning source curriculum, represents the precommissioning portion of the JPME continuum.⁶⁵ In accordance with the OPMEP, the focus of precommissioning PME curriculum should be oriented toward providing “a basic grounding in the U.S. defense establishment and their chosen Military Service, as well as a foundation in

⁶³ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP)*, Washington, D.C.: JCS, 2005, OPMEP 1800c, E-B-A-1.

⁶⁴ John M. McHugh and George W. Casey, Jr. *A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2010*. Posture Statement presented to the 111th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2010). The BOLC program was restructured to a two-phase program of instruction that combined BOLC I and portions of BOLC II into one phase, BOLC-A, in order “to reduce lieutenants’ wait time to attend training, improve lieutenant throughput through the program, and get officers to their first unit assignment earlier.” Portions of BOLC II and BOLC III were also combined into BOLC-B.

⁶⁵ ROTC Faculty Handbook, *BOLC I: ROTC Curriculum Faculty Handbook*, (Fort Monroe, VA: United States Army Cadet Command, 2008) and Cadet Command Regulation 145-3, Reserve Officer Training Corps Precommissioning Training and Leadership Development, (Fort Monroe, VA: United States Army Cadet Command, 2006). The ROTC curriculum consists of the Basic Course and the Advanced Course conducted over four years. The first year’s focus is “The Role of the Army” and consists of Roles and Origins of the Army, Army Customs and Traditions, Branches of the Army, and Military Operations and Tactics. The second year focuses on the “The Role of an Officer” and consists of Role of the Officer and Noncommissioned Officer, Communications, Code of Conduct, First Aid, Principles of War, and Military Operations and Tactics as its subjects. The third year focuses on “Small Unit Training” and consists of Command and Staff Functions, Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Warfare, Law of War, Weapons, Human Behavior, Math Reasoning, Computer Science, and Military Operations and Tactics as its subjects. Finally, the fourth year focuses on “Transition to Becoming an Officer” and consists of Military Justice, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare, Army Personnel Management, Army Logistics, Post and Installation Support, and Military Operations and Tactics.

leadership, management, ethics, and other subjects necessary” for the preparation of commissioned officers.” The joint emphasis for these schools is “basic US defense structure, roles and missions of other Military Services, the combatant command structure and the nature of American military power and joint warfare.”⁶⁶ By comparing the focus as required by the OPMEP and the actual curriculum and description of the precommissioning schools, it becomes clear that these schools do not meet the OPMEP requirements for joint educational focus.

BOLC-B, as well as the CCCs, represent the primary portion of the JPME continuum.⁶⁷ The focus for the primary PME curriculum is to prepare “officers for service in Joint Task Forces (JTF) where a thorough introduction in joint warfighting is required.” The programs at the primary level are required to address the fundamentals of joint warfare, JTF organization and the combatant command structure, the characteristics of a joint campaign, how national and joint systems support tactical-level operations and the capabilities of the relevant systems of the other Services.”⁶⁸ According to TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-2, *The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015*, BOLC-B “develops Army values and core leadership attributes in junior officers as well as branch-defined technical and tactical skills for demonstrated proficiency at platoon and company levels.” The same manual describes the purpose of the CCCs as preparing “company grade officers for company level command or battalion and brigade staff positions.”⁶⁹ Again, there

⁶⁶ OPMEP 1800d, A-A-3 and E-B-1.

⁶⁷ Department of the U.S. Army Headquarters, *The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015* (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Department of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2010), 45. The *Army Learning Concept* describes BOLC-B as an IMT officers course initially, but later identifies it as the first level of primary PME when it states that the “CCC is the second level of an officer’s primary level education after BOLC A and B.”

⁶⁸ OPMEP 1800d, E-B-1.

⁶⁹ *The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015*, 44-47. The manual states that CCCs provide “captains the tactical, technical, and leadership knowledge, skills, and attributes needed to lead company-size units and serve on battalion and brigade staffs. The course emphasizes the development of leader competencies while integrating students’ recent operational experiences. Curriculum includes common core subjects, branch-specific tactical and technical instruction, and branch-immaterial staff officer instruction.”

appears to be a significant disconnect between the OPMEP requirement for primary joint education and the Army's implementation.

These discrepancies may not be the result of an accidental omission on the part of the curriculum developers. A comparison of the 2009 and 2010 Army Posture Statement identifies an institutional change in what BOLC is supposed to accomplish. While the 2009 Army Posture Statement identifies BOLC as supporting "officer education system transformation and the goals of increased readiness, greater relevance of the force, and a more Joint and expeditionary Army," the 2010 Army Posture Statement identifies BOLC as supporting "Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) requirements."⁷⁰ Clearly, the focus of precommissioning and primary JPME is trending away from joint aspects.

Recognizing the insufficiency of primary level education in the Army, the CGSC recently developed the School of Advanced Leadership and Tactics (SALT) "to provide officer continuing education towards developing the Scholar-Warrior-Leader from First Lieutenant to selection for Major."⁷¹ According to Colonel William Raymond, the first director of the school, SALT was established as a result of a recent study of the Army's fifteen different CCCs, all having "varying standards and conditions," in order to provide the Army's junior officers with "the knowledge and skills and necessary to serve as company commanders and staff officers...in complex circumstances."⁷² The addition of SALT to the primary level of education is a good start to preparing officers for joint staff positions earlier in their career and provides an added benefit of

⁷⁰ 2010 Army Posture Statement. See also Pete Geren and George W. Casey, Jr. *A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2009*. Posture Statement presented to the 111th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2009).

⁷¹ Command and General Staff College, "School of Advanced Leadership and Tactics," United States Army Combined Arms Center, <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/CGSC/SALT/> (accessed March 15, 2011).

⁷² William M. Raymond, Jr., Keith R. Beurkens and Steve M. Carmichael, "The Criticality of Captains' Education: Now and in the Future," *Military Review* (Nov-Dec 2010): 51-57.

eventually leading to “more advanced instruction at CGSC-ILE because those students will have already obtained critical thinking and basic leadership skills in SALT.”⁷³

In summary, many officers are ill prepared to serve in joint staff position because of a lack of substantial joint education prior to intermediate education. The precommissioning and primary levels of JPME in the army’s schools do not sufficiently include joint subjects and do not have any joint oversight or accreditation. This will continue to be a problem as joint assignments continue to be filled with officers who have not completed JPME I. “The proportion of grades O-4 and below serving in joint staff officer positions, the lack of JPME attendance, the lack of joint knowledge specific training available, and the high proportion of officers serving in their first joint assignments” are major reasons why senior leaders are concerned about staff officers’ abilities to perform well in joint duty assignments.⁷⁴ It is vitally important that the precommissioning and primary courses correct the trend of focusing away from joint subjects and take seriously their requirements as “preparatory JPME.” While the precommissioning and primary schools are supposed to prepare officers for the continuation of their joint education, it is JPME I where the start of preparation for joint duty assignments begin. While legislation directing the assignment of officers graduating from JPME I schools has disappeared, most joint staff assignments are still being filled by JPME I graduates. As the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) report points out, while most O-4s in joint duty assignments have completed ILE, they are still not prepared. This “begs the questions as to whether ILE (with JPME I) is sufficient preparation for joint duty assignments at the Combatant Commands.”⁷⁵

⁷³ Melissa Bower, “SALT to Administer New Captains’ Course,” *Fort Leavenworth Lamp*, <http://www.ftleavenworthlamp.com/features/x1864248882/SALT-to-administer-new-captains-course> (accessed March 15, 2011).

⁷⁴ Fenty, 6.

⁷⁵ *Another Crossroads*, 35.

Curriculum

Adaptability in the curriculum is critical to the success of any educational system. The Army has attempted to adapt its curriculum at ILE to better prepare its officers to operate in the contemporary operating environment. The recent publication of TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-2, *The United States Army Learning Concept for 2015*, further supports that the Army is continuing to focus on “an adaptive development and delivery system...that extends knowledge to Soldiers at the operational edge, is capable of updating learning content rapidly, and is responsive to operational force needs.”⁷⁶ While adaptation in the face of the complexities associated with the current operating environment is important, it is imperative to continue to focus on the enduring subject matters that will prepare officers to serve as leaders and staff officers in the joint operating environment. The ILE curriculum is a zero-sum game, for every Learning Area, Learning Objective, Competency, or Special Area of Emphasis that is added to the curriculum, other subject matter necessarily receives reduced emphasis or, in some cases, is cut completely.

As a JPME I accredited school, ILE not only develops its curriculum to “advance both the art and science of the profession of arms in support of Army operational requirements,” but it is also beholden to a myriad of joint legislative and policy requirements that have developed throughout the years.⁷⁷ This includes guidance that has evolved from the Goldwater-Nichols Act and Skelton Report as well as from the Joint Staff through the publication of the OPMEP. Additionally, while the Army, in particular Leader Development and Education (LD&E), continually reviews and updates the ILE curriculum, the Joint Staff adds additional requirements as result of a series of joint reviews and councils. As a result, the curriculum at ILE is both too broad, which detracts from the schools ability to focus on educating officers in joint matters and

⁷⁶ *The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015*, 11.

⁷⁷ U.S. Army Combined Arms Center Leader Development and Education (LD&E)/US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Bulletin No. 30, Curriculum Development: The Accountable Instructional System (AIS), 18 March 2010.

prepare them to serve in joint duty assignments, and insufficient to prepare officers for their job as a joint staff officer.

Over the twenty-five years since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the notion that “JPME is not intended to prepare officers for their job as staff officers” has somehow become the norm.⁷⁸ The Goldwater-Nichols Act intended just the opposite. While not designed specifically to create joint staff officers, by law JPME is required to prepare officers for joint duty assignments.⁷⁹ The Skelton Report further supported this idea when it stated that:

The service intermediate schools should teach both joint and service systems – organizations, processes, procedures, and staff skills – to all students. This is necessary to meet the Goldwater Nichols Act requirement to revise the curricula of service schools to strengthen focus on joint matters and prepare officers for joint duty assignments.⁸⁰

Not only did the Skelton Panel recognize the need for all students to learn the mechanics of joint matters and “staff skills” necessary to serve in joint duty assignments, but it also envisioned the intermediate-level PME schools as “the principal schools for learning jointness.”⁸¹

As part of its recommendation for establishing JPME I, the Skelton Panel recommended that the curriculum should include: “capabilities and limitations, doctrine, organizational concepts, and command and control of forces of all services; joint planning processes and systems; and the role of service commands as part of a unified command.” Furthermore, it recommended that service intermediate schools be focused on the “operational art with an introduction to military strategy.”⁸² While the Skelton Panel provided its recommendations as to what the curriculum at JPME I schools should include, legislation still authorizes the CJCS to

⁷⁸ *Another Crossroads*, 36.

⁷⁹ *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, 37.

⁸⁰ *Report of the Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress*, 81.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 14-15. The mechanics of joint matters are described as other service capabilities, limitations and doctrines, and the relevant joint procedures and processes.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 4 and 34.

control its content within the limits of current legislation.⁸³ The CJCS provides curricula guidance to the PME schools through the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP). The OPMEP requires that the intermediate service schools provide instruction in specified joint learning areas in order to maintain their accreditation as a JPME Phase I institution. The current OPMEP includes six learning areas that encompass thirty learning objectives.⁸⁴

As previously stated, the Goldwater Nichols Act and the Skelton Report identify the intermediate schools as the principal school to educate all officers in joint matters and prepare them for joint duty assignments. However, the OPMEP, while recognizing the need to educate all officers at the intermediate level, identifies JPME as merely “that portion of PME that supports fulfillment of the educational requirements for joint officer management.”⁸⁵ Furthermore, it specifies that intermediate service schools should teach joint operations from a service component perspective.⁸⁶ This focus of JPME on meeting educational requirements for JQOs and the service-centric focus on joint education at the intermediate level is contrary to the intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Skelton Report of preparing all officers for joint duty assignments.⁸⁷

In accordance with the Skelton report, the CJCS controls and accredits JPME I institutions. In order to accomplish this, the CJCS sends a PAJE team to each of the JPME

⁸³ USC, Title 10, Armed Forces, Chapter 107, §2151-2154. The law requires that Phase I JPME consist of “all the elements of a joint professional military education” which includes at least National Military Strategy, Joint planning at all levels of war, Joint doctrine, Joint command and control, and Joint force and joint requirements development.

⁸⁴ OPMEP 1800d, Appendix C to Enclosure B.

⁸⁵ Ibid., A-A-6 and A-A-4.

⁸⁶ Ibid., A-A-7 and E-C-1. The policy states that “service ILCs teach joint operations from the standpoint of Service forces in a joint force supported by Service component commands” and “the Service ILCs’ joint mission is to expand student understanding, from a Service component perspective, of joint force employment at the operational and tactical levels of war.”

⁸⁷ *Another Crossroads*, 33. The HASC concurred that “former connections supporting JPME I...as preparation for joint duty assignments (has) been substantially weakened.”

schools, including the CGSC, to, among other things, review its curriculum to ensure it adequately covers each of the learning areas identified in the OPMEP. In its most recent findings, the PAJE found that the curriculum met all standards and objectives and recommended to reaffirm the accreditation of the program through 2014. However, the PAJE did provide several general observations including the lack of coordination between the Department of Joint, International and Multinational Operations (DJIMO) case studies and the Department of History lessons. It also noted that the exercises and practical application venues, while providing sufficient air-ground interface, included minimal maritime play.⁸⁸ In order to prove that the CGSC curricula is in compliance with the OPMEP, the CGSC Accreditation Coordination Division (ACD) completes a crosswalk of each Academic Year's (AY) ILE Common Core curriculum and JPME Phase I learning objectives. For AY 2011, the crosswalk indicated that the ILE Common Core curriculum was in compliance with the OPMEP by covering each of the thirty JPME Phase I learning objectives.

In addition to the OPMEP's Learning Areas and Objectives, the content of the intermediate service school's curriculum is also weighted down with additional requirements. These requirements range from tasks outlined in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) as well as Special Areas of Emphasis (SAEs) that are developed in the Military Education Coordinating Committee (MECC). It is vitally important that PME schools continue to update their curriculum as emerging topics are developed. Current legislation not only allows for the adaptation of curricular content but also mandates it.⁸⁹ The Skelton Panel recognized the need for adapting the curricula "if deficiencies in the knowledge or abilities of the schools' graduates are identified."⁹⁰

⁸⁸ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Process For Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE), Report of Accreditation of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Intermediate Level Education Resident Program (25-29 February 2008), 2-3.

⁸⁹ USC, Title 10, Armed Forces, Chapter 107, §2152.

⁹⁰ Report of the Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress, 82.

Brigadier General Sean B. MacFarland, Deputy Commandant of the Army's Command and General Staff College, stated during testimony to the House Armed Services Committee that "our Professional Military Education continues to reflect our adaptability to changing conditions" and that "we continuously review our officer Professional Military Education to ensure it remains relevant to our force and national needs."⁹¹ Despite this need for adaptation in the curriculum, care must be taken to preserve the enduring subject matter while including the emerging topics from ongoing operations.

One of the main methods for the adaptation of the joint curriculum is through Military Education Coordinating Committee (MECC). The MECC is an advisory body to the Director of the Joint Staff on PME issues. The purpose of the MECC is to address key educational issues of interest to the joint education community, promote cooperation and collaboration among the MECC member institutions and coordinate joint education initiatives.⁹² Each year the MECC identifies several Special Areas of Emphasis (SAEs) that, once approved by the CJCS, are to be incorporated into the JPME curricula. The 2010 approved JPME SAEs were: Building Partnership Capacity, Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), Net-Centric Information Sharing, Strategic Communication, Operational Contract Support Education for Non-acquisition DoD Personnel, Space as a Contested Environment, Psychological Health Awareness, Security Force Assistance, and Joint Targeting.⁹³ While the CGSC policy requires the ACD to crosswalk the curricula to ensure support and integration of the SAEs, the JPME crosswalks only include the

⁹¹ Brigadier General Sean B. MacFarland, Deputy Commandant, Army Command and General College, Statement before the House Committee on Oversight and Investigations. *Another Crossroads? Professional Military Education Two Decades After the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel*, November 30, 2010. 111th Congress, 2nd Session, 3-4.

⁹² OPMEP 1800d, C-1.

⁹³ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010 Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Special Areas of Emphasis, 17 May 2010.

Joint Learning Areas and Objectives from the OPMEP and do not include the SAEs from the MECC.⁹⁴

Another method for adapting the curriculum to meet the current operating environment is through the publication of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The QDR is a legislatively-mandated review of DoD strategy and priorities conducted every four years by the Secretary of Defense.⁹⁵ The most recent QDR, dated 12 Feb 2010, also provides guidance for the curricula of professional military education. It requires PME institutions to “place special emphasis on stability operations, counterinsurgency, and the building of partner capacity skill sets.”⁹⁶ While these additional tasks do place an additional burden on the curriculum, ILE mitigates these issues by utilizing an integrated curriculum approach which addresses “multiple learning outcomes in common lesson blocks.”⁹⁷

While the curriculum at ILE meets the requirements to maintain accreditation in accordance with the OPMEP, the question remains as to whether it is sufficient to prepare officers for joint duty assignments. According to 959 ILE graduates serving in joint staff assignments asked to identify how effective ILE was in preparing them for their current staff work, the average response was 3.2 out five.⁹⁸ In a recent survey of ILE graduates prepared by the Quality Assurance Office at CGSC, only fifty-five percent of officers felt that ILE had prepared them “to operate as a field grade commander and staff officer in full-spectrum Joint environments.” Additionally, eleven percent of the respondents found that the joint portion of ILE was not effective and provided multiple comments from graduates including “I am no more qualified to

⁹⁴ CGSC Bulletin 30 and AY 2011 Crosswalk.

⁹⁵ USC, Title 10, Armed Forces, Chapter 2, §118(a).

⁹⁶ U.S. Department of Defense. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. (Washington, D.C.: Dept. of Defense, 2010), 54.

⁹⁷ *Another Crossroads*, 323.

⁹⁸ Fenty, 59. Based on a scale of 0=not helpful, 3=moderately helpful, and 5=exceptional.

operate in a joint, multinational, or interagency position than I was before I attended ILE.”⁹⁹

While these surveys do not definitively determine CGSC’s efficiency in preparing officers to serve in joint duty assignments, it does provide some useful insight.

In addition to the common core curricula, CGSC provides a number of joint focused elective courses available to the students at the end of each academic year including the capability to attain an Additional Skill Identifier as a Joint Planner.¹⁰⁰ However, the program of instruction for these courses do not mandate non-host service student participation, does not require non-host service faculty participation, and is not subject to review or accreditation by the PAJE. The necessity of these electives, as well as other schools and programs, such as the Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies and the CGSC Interagency Fellowship, indicates that ILE alone is inadequate.¹⁰¹

In summary, ILE is sufficiently adapting its curriculum to meet the challenges of the contemporary operating environment. However, care should be taken to ensure that enduring subject matter that focuses on preparing officers to serve in joint duty assignments is not sacrificed. The Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Skelton Report confirm that JPME is intended to prepare officers for their jobs as staff officers, despite claims to the contrary. However, the OPMEP is disconnected from this reality insofar as it is more focused on completing the educational requirements for JQOs rather than preparing for officers for joint duty assignments. While the ILE curriculum meets the requirements of the OPMEP, surveys of recent graduates indicate that ILE is insufficient preparation for field grade officers to serve in joint duty

⁹⁹ Quality Assurance Officer, US Army Command and General Staff College Intermediate Level Education Graduate Survey Report, (Fort Leavenworth, KS, March 2009), 4 and 11.

¹⁰⁰ U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Elective Memorandum of Instruction for Class 08-01, Enclosure 5, Focused Programs, October 15, 2007. The Joint Planner program educates officers for future assignments on joint staffs. ASI 3H, Joint Planner, identifies positions requiring personnel qualified in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). It consists of three classes – Joint Force Command, Advanced Joint Operations Planning, and Advanced Global Command and Control Systems.

¹⁰¹ MacFarland, 5.

assignments. The necessity of joint planning electives and other programs further support this argument in that they imply a recognition by the school that the ILE curriculum alone is not enough. The Army recognizes the need for adaptable officers capable of solving complex problems as the publication of *The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015*, with its focus on adaptability, as well as the number of curriculum reviews indicate. ILE curriculum writers must strike a balance between adapting to meet the short-term needs of the Army while maintaining the enduring subject matter to prepare officers for joint duty assignments.

Student and Faculty Composition

While the curriculum “sets the stage” for joint education, officer education cannot be considered joint without a mixed representation of quality non-host service students and faculty. The Skelton Panel identifies these, along with commandants, presidents and pedagogy, as “the bedrock of professional military education.”¹⁰² Two main issues call into question whether the diversity and quality of the student population and faculty is sufficient to prepare officers to operate in the joint operating environment. First, the Army’s decision to transition from a board that selected the top fifty percent of all majors to attend in-residence PME to universal ILE for the entire major population has negatively affected both the student and faculty population. This decision has affected the non-host services ability to send quality students to CGSC which resulted in a conditional joint accreditation status being placed on ILE in 2009. Additionally, the military faculty size has not been able to keep up with the almost two-fold increase in students. Second, the lack of experienced senior military instructors from across the services calls into question the ability of ILE to provide a joint military education. Current legislation and policy place only minimal requirements on the intermediate service schools to ensure they employ a high number of military faculty members from across the services. Additionally, recent

¹⁰² *Report of the Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress*, 64 and 133.

legislation that prohibits officers from receiving joint credit while serving in a JPME I faculty billet has made it more difficult to recruit the highest quality non-host service faculty and calls into question whether or not JPME I provides sufficient instruction in joint matters.¹⁰³

A student population that includes non-host service members is critical to the success of any joint school. The Army's decision to transition to universal ILE has had the unintended, or possibly intended, impact of creating a situation where the sister services are forced to send additional officers to ILE without having changed their policies regarding officer attendance at intermediate service schools. In other words, the sister services simply lack the capacity to fill the ILE requirements for sister-service students.¹⁰⁴ In December 2009, ILE was placed on a conditional accreditation status due to a failure to comply with the policy for student service mix within the College's resident seminars.¹⁰⁵ The August 2009 start class (10-01) was composed of sixty-eight staff groups but only had sixty-seven Air Force officers and sixty Sea Service (Navy, Marine, and Coast Guard) officers, which left nine of its seminars short a sister service student.¹⁰⁶ In January 2011, the conditional accreditation status was rescinded and CGSC's resident ILE program JPME-I accreditation status was fully restored once the College proved that all resident classes met the OPMEP-mandated policy.¹⁰⁷ For AY 2011, which includes the August 2010 and February 2011 start dates, the number of resident ILE staff groups were limited

¹⁰³ *John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007*, sec. 519.

¹⁰⁴ *Another Crossroads*, 139. See also U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. 2010. *Raising Thinking from the Tactical to the Operational Level: JPME I and JPME II at the Services' and Joint Command and Staff Colleges*. 111th Congress, 1st Session, June 25.

¹⁰⁵ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Process For Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE), Report of Accreditation of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Intermediate Level Education Resident Program (15 December 2009), 2.

¹⁰⁶ PAJE 2010. See also Sister Service shortage and Seas Service Shortage information papers.

¹⁰⁷ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Process For Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE), Report of Accreditation of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Intermediate Level Education Resident Program (19 January 2011), 1.

by the total Sea Service students attending. The August 2010 class had sixty-six Sea Service students and the February 2011 class had twenty-one Sea Service students totaling eight-seven students to fill a maximum of ninety-six staff groups. This forced the CGSC to limit the number of resident ILE staff groups to eighty-seven rather than leaving nine staff groups not meeting the minimum requirements for non-host students. Additionally, future projections for non-host service students only appear to be getting worse. While the Air Force is projected to be able to meet the minimum requirements in the foreseeable future, the Sea Service student projections continue to decrease from eighty-seven per year to eighty-four per year: sixty-three for the August start dates and twenty-one for the February start dates for AY 2012.¹⁰⁸

The CGSC has attempted to mitigate this issue through the implementation of Intermediate Level Education – Blended Learning (ILE-BL) where students attend a sixteen-week resident school at Fort Leavenworth and then complete the remainder of their requirements via distance learning. In order to maintain joint accreditation, the intermediate resident schools must maintain at least one non-host service student per service per staff group.¹⁰⁹ However, ILE-BL has bypassed this requirement, teaching this course with a strictly army student population in order to reduce the ILE backlog.¹¹⁰ The lack of any non-host service students in ILE-BL reduces the capability of the school to provide a joint education. As a former student described in a CGSC blog on the topic, “the one attribute we are missing from BL-ILE is the points of view from our brethren in the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. Having them in our staff groups can greatly

¹⁰⁸ PAJE 2011. See also MEMORANDUM FOR Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7 (DAMO-TR), 400 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310-0400; SUBJECT: Reducing the Intermediate Level Education Backlog, (December 15, 2010).

¹⁰⁹ OPMEP 1800d, B-1.

¹¹⁰ PAJE 2011. See also MEMORANDUM FOR Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7 (DAMO-TR), 400 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310-0400; SUBJECT: Reducing the Intermediate Level Education Backlog, (December 15, 2010).

facilitate our learning and interaction with sister services, which can serve us well, since at some point in our careers, most of us will experience a joint assignment.....or two.”¹¹¹

While student demographics are important to the quality of education, particularly in a more active learning environment, the faculty represents “the determinant factor in quality education.”¹¹² The Skelton Panel recognized their importance when they stated, “an excellent curriculum or an outstanding student body cannot compensate for a mediocre faculty.”¹¹³ While recent reports do not necessarily accuse the faculty of mediocrity, they do point out some recent deficiencies such as a decrease in the number of former battalion and brigade commanders, an overall lack of both host and non-host service military faculty, and a lack of faculty with post-graduate degrees.¹¹⁴ While some of these issues may be tied to the increase in operational tempo due to requirements in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other parts of the world, the increase in the number of students due to the implementation of universal ILE is also to blame.

In order to meet the minimum requirements of the current OPMEP, Sea Service and Air Force officers must each account for five percent of the military faculty at intermediate service schools.¹¹⁵ As of September 17, 2010, CGSC met the requirements of the OPMEP with the Sea Service accounting for seven percent and the Air Force accounting for 7.6 percent of the military faculty. However, this number, and the requirement itself, can be misleading. There is no statutory requirement that provides a minimum ratio of military to civilian instructors, however, the desired “goal,” according to the CGSC’s Accreditation Coordination Division, is for military

¹¹¹ Gary Loucks, “Blended a Good Concept, but Continual Improvement Is Needed: Learning (BL) ILE,” CGSC Student Blog, entry posted June 22, 2009, http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/BLOG/blogs/cgsc_student_blog/archive/2009/06/22/blended-learning-bl-ile-a-good-concept-but-continual-improvement-is-needed.aspx (accessed March 14, 2011).

¹¹² *Report of the Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress*, 133.

¹¹³ Ibid., 133.

¹¹⁴ *Another Crossroads*, 115-116.

¹¹⁵ OPMEP 1800d , B-2.

officers to account for at least thirty percent of the faculty.¹¹⁶ The Skelton report did not address the civilian to military faculty ratio as an issue, nor did it recommend a minimum goal. During the time the Skelton Panel was convened, the ratio between civilian and military faculty was significantly different than it is currently. During AY 1987-88, civilian faculty accounted for just over eight percent of the total faculty (35 civilian to 383 military faculty).¹¹⁷ The current ratio, as of September 17, 2010, is seventy-three percent civilian to twenty-seven percent military.¹¹⁸ While this number is close to the desired goal, it is far from what it was prior to the Skelton report. Recently, in a statement before the House Armed Services Committee, Brigadier General MacFarland, Deputy Commandant of the Army Command and General Staff College, recognizing the relatively low number of military faculty members stated that “a balance closer to fifty percent would allow us to better develop both the rotational military faculty and maintain closer ties to the operating force.”¹¹⁹ Again this issue could be tied directly to the increased operations tempo, however, other military university faculties, such as the U.S. Military Academy, where the ratio has remained steady at about seventy-five percent military to twenty-five percent civilian, have not suffered from the same problem.¹²⁰

It could be argued that the Skelton panel did not recommend a minimum military-civilian faculty ratio for intermediate service schools because it did not consider current operational experience as vitally important to a quality education. However, it is more plausible that the existing conditions, that of a very high number of military as opposed to civilian faculty

¹¹⁶ U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Accreditation Coordination Division Information Paper, Subject: Resident Intermediate Level Education (ILE) Student-to-Faculty Ratio as of 17 September 2010.

¹¹⁷ *Report of the Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress*, 143.

¹¹⁸ U.S. Army CGSC Information Paper, Subject: Resident Intermediate Level Education (ILE).

¹¹⁹ MacFarland, 12.

¹²⁰ United States Military Academy Public Affairs Office, West Point Faculty Fact Sheet, West Point, NY, December 22, 2008.

members, at the time the panel convened represented an acceptable ratio and the panel did not expect the military to civilian faculty ratio at the intermediate service schools to change as drastically as it has. Additionally, the Skelton panel initially recommended that the host service faculty account for seventy percent of the military faculty with the other thirty percent coming from the non-host services (fifteen percent from each). Since the focus of the Skelton panel was on joint education, it can only be inferred that the panel was not necessarily as concerned with the number of military faculty as a whole, but rather they were most concerned with ensuring that there was an appropriate amount of non-host service military faculty. Given the number of military faculty at CGSC at the time the panel convened and the recommendations for the minimum number of non-host service faculty, the panel would have expected that ILE would have a minimum of thirteen percent non-host service faculty per service when including the aggregate of civilian and military faculty. When compared to the current actual aggregate percentage of 1.89 percent Sea Service and 2.05 percent Air Force faculty, it becomes clear that the current diversity of military faculty is not even close to actually being joint. Additionally, since the joint learning areas are inextricably woven into the core curriculum, “faculty representation from each military department is required for the entire curriculum.”¹²¹

For ILE students attending the Blended Learning program, the situation is even worse. The OPMEP specifically authorizes non-resident education programs, such as ILE-BL, not to have to meet the same faculty mix requirements as resident programs. The OPMEP does however require the schools to “show proper faculty staffing for the methodology being used and that all students have reasonable access to faculty subject matter expertise and counseling.”¹²² The latest PAJE report for ILE-BL points out that “students have interaction with sister-service faculty members. Although no sister-service faculty members are currently assigned to the blended-

¹²¹ *Report of the Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress*, 67 and 107.

¹²² OPMEP 1800d, B-6.

learning teaching team, students at Fort Leavenworth have access to sister-service faculty members at the College.”¹²³ However, JPME I is part of the in-residence phase of ILE-BL and should be held to the same standard as the rest of the in-residence JPME I programs.

Additionally, the OPMEP does state that intermediate “non-resident programs should, when delivered in a group environment, seek diversity in student populations by providing enrollment opportunities to non-host Services, Reserve Components, and DoD and non-DoD civilians.”¹²⁴ Despite both the lack of students and faculty from the non-host services, ILE-BL has been granted accreditation by the Joint Staff/J-7 through February 2014.¹²⁵

One of the issues associated with selecting and recruiting the requisite amount of high-quality non-host Service faculty for both resident ILE and ILE-BL is the difficulty in awarding joint credit to JPME I military faculty.¹²⁶ In a report, dated August 3, 2010, the Joint Staff J-1 reported that “joint duty credit is a faculty quality issue which encourages and facilitates the best and brightest operationally experienced officers to be naturally inclined to seek faculty duty.”¹²⁷ It additionally found that “this change can impact a school’s faculty recruiting, its ability to meet ILE OPMEP accreditation standards, and the quality of its military faculty.”¹²⁸ The overriding question is whether or not non-host service faculty gain “joint matters” experience while teaching at a JPME I course. According to the *Report of Joint Duty Credit for Joint Professional Military Education (Phase I) Instructors*, the type of experience gained during instructing JPME I courses does not provide the type of joint matters experience that meets the requirements of being granted

¹²³ PAJE ILE-BL, 2009, 4.

¹²⁴ OPMEP 1800d, B-6.

¹²⁵ PAJE ILE-BL, 2009, 4.

¹²⁶ U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. 2010. *Raising Thinking from the Tactical to the Operational Level: JPME I and JPME II at the Services’ and Joint Command and Staff Colleges*. 111th Congress, 1st Session, June 25.

¹²⁷ Joint Staff, J1, Report of Joint Duty Credit for Joint Professional Military Education (Phase I) Instructors, 3 August 2010, 2.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 13.

joint credit.¹²⁹ While recent changes to the legislation are pending in order to provide Joint Credit to JPME I instructors on a case-by-case basis, the problem remains.¹³⁰ If JPME I does not, in all cases, constitute the type of joint matters experience that meets the requirements of being granted joint credit for the instructor, then clearly the students are not provided the requisite amount of study in joint matters to attain credit for the completion of JPME I.

In summary, a quality and diverse student and faculty composition are crucial to the success of a joint education. The transition to universal intermediate education has created a condition where the sister services are unable to provide the requisite amount of student and military faculty members to meet the requirements of the OPMEP while filling the maximum number of ILE classes. This has forced CGSC to develop ILE-BL in order to ensure that all officers complete their joint education requirements. However, ILE-BL is only a compromise. It does not maintain the same non-host service student and faculty requirements as the in-residence program yet it is still granted full JPME I accreditation by the joint staff. Additionally, the current policies regarding minimum non-host service faculty members at the in-residence programs, while meeting legislative requirements, are insufficient for providing a truly joint education. Furthermore, current legislation limiting the awarding of joint credit to JPME I faculty members makes it difficult to attract high-quality non-host service faculty and brings in to question how much ILE is actually focused on joint matters.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 15.

¹³⁰ Congressional Testimony to HASC, 30 Nov 2010 of Mr. Lernes J. Hebert Acting Director, Officer & Enlisted Personnel Management Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense. Mr. Hebert reported to the committee that “my office drafted a legislative change to the Fiscal Year 2011 NDAA in the Omnibus Bill to change the language in §621 providing Joint Duty credit to JPME I instructors on a case by case basis, as is suggested by the Report.”

Conclusions

The publication of *Another Crossroads?* by the House Armed Services Committee made clear that the U.S. military needs to continue to reassess its joint professional military education system to ensure it is preparing its officers for conflict in the twenty-first century. With the U.S. military still involved in two major conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, officer education remains as important as ever. Unfortunately, there is significant evidence that many Army officers assigned to joint duty staff position are unprepared. After analyzing the joint education Army officers receive throughout their career, and in particular at the intermediate level, the following conclusions are offered.

First, there is a significant gap in the preparatory phase of the joint education continuum. Although ILE graduates fill the majority of joint duty assignments, current legislation and policy allows for about sixty percent of all JDAL billets to be filled by company grade or non-ILE complete field grade officers. While the Skelton Panel recognized the intermediate level of education as the primary level for learning jointness, it also pointed out that joint education begins with the first military education an officer receives. Currently, the precommissioning curriculum for the preponderance of future officers, that is ROTC, is void of virtually any joint subjects. Additionally, the Army's purpose for primary education, as described in *The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015*, does not reconcile with the joint learning areas as required in the OPMEP. Without joint oversight, such as the PAJE or the recently removed Triennial Report, precommissioning and primary officer education diverges from the joint education goals prescribed by the CJCS. The first comprehensive joint educational experience an officer receives is through ILE. This is too late given the number of pre-ILE officers serving in joint duty assignments. Additionally, without the basic understanding of joint matters that should be learned during the preparatory phases, officers arrive at ILE unprepared to begin intensive study. The Army's recent introduction of the School of Advanced Leadership and Tactics, while not joint focused, may be a step in the right direction for filling the gap left by the precommissioning and

primary schools' inability to prepare officers for not only staff assignments, but also for the rest of their joint education.

Second, the JPME I curriculum at ILE meets the basic requirements of the OPMEP, Title X, and other regulatory documents. However, surveys conducted by the CGSC Quality Assurance Office and Dr. Linda Fenty suggest that JPME I insufficiently prepares officers for joint duty assignments. While *The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015* recognizes the necessity to adapt the curriculum content, there is an inherent tension between updating the curriculum with contemporary themes and maintaining the necessary enduring subject matter. The OPMEP dictates the basic required curriculum content to meet the requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, while the QDR and the MECC provide additional guidance and input for the joint curriculum. The result being that the inclusion into the joint curriculum of these numerous contemporary topics detract from the enduring subject matter that focuses on educating officers in joint matters and preparing them to serve in joint duty assignments. Additionally, the commonly held view that JPME I is not intended to prepare officers for joint staff positions but rather is to fulfill the educational requirements for joint officer management is contrary to the mandate of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Until this disconnect is corrected, JPME I will continue to be insufficient preparation for joint duty assignments.

Finally, the Army's decision to transition to a universal in-residence ILE has negatively affected its ability to provide a joint education for its students. First, the sister services have been unable to provide the requisite number of non-host service students to fill all of the classrooms necessary to educate every Army major. This resulted in ten ILE small groups not meeting the student ratio minimums in accordance with the OPMEP during AY 2010. Additionally, the inability of the sister schools to provide enough students to fill each of the classrooms results in a requirement for the Army to overcome this shortfall through an increased number of ILE-BL classes. ILE-BL is a compromise between providing a joint education for all and drawing down the backlog of Army majors awaiting residence ILE. There is no requirement for ILE-BL to meet

student body or faculty ratios in current policy and legislation, yet the program still maintains its joint accreditation. Furthermore, the increase in the number of total students due to the transition to universal ILE has resulted in a requirement for a significant increase in the number of faculty. Current legislation and policy does not place a minimum requirement on the number of military faculty at the intermediate service schools and has resulted in military instructors comprising less than thirty percent of the total faculty. Of these military faculty members, only five percent are required to be from each of the non-host services. This results in less than four percent of the total faculty to be from a non-host service. Since the joint curriculum at ILE is inextricably woven into the core curriculum, it requires a joint faculty that spans the curriculum. However, since the transition to universal in-residence ILE has coincided with an increase in the operational tempo of the armed forces and new legislation that makes it difficult for JPME I instructors to receive joint credit, it has become more difficult to fill the increased number of required instructors. In particular, it is difficult for service schools to attract not only experienced military faculty members, such as former battalion commanders but also a sufficient number of military faculty members from across the services.

Contemporary military history suggests that military effectiveness is inexplicably linked to the quality of the officer professional military education institutions. It is essential that the Army continue to place emphasis on preparing intellectual, adaptable, and capable officers to serve in joint duty assignments. While earlier joint education, a greater focus on staff competencies in the curriculum, and a greater diversity in the student and faculty composition may assist ILE better prepare its graduates for joint duty assignments, changes to education alone are not enough. ILE is only the formal portion of a field grade officer's joint education. To meet the challenges of the contemporary operating environment, an officer's joint education must also include lifelong self-study and experience and it is incumbent on the individual officer to continue their personal professional study and self-development in preparation for assignments to joint staff positions.

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